Mechanical proof systems for logic: Reaching consensus by groups of intelligent agents  by Rasiowa, Helena
Mechanical Proof Systems 
for Logic: Reaching 
Consensus by Groups of 
Intelligent Agents 
Helena Rasiowa 
Department o f  Computer Science, University o f  North Carolina, 
Charlotte, North Carolina 
ABSTRACT 
Reasoning about reaching consensus by groups of intelligent agents has been 
discussed and formalized by Rasiowa and Marek within the framework of a 
modified logic for approximation reasoning. Two kinds of knowledge operators 
have been applied: perception operators and epistemic operators. The present 
paper is restricted to the fragment with perception operators and presents 
theorem-proving systems of Gentzen style and of the resolution style. They are 
based on systems formulated by Rasiowa, Sikorski; and Robinson for classical 
predicate calculi and on those given by Orlowska for Post predicate calculi. 
KEYWORDS: perception logic, decomposition scheme, decomposition 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Investigations concerning analysis of reasoning about knowledge of one or 
several intelligent agents have in recent periods been developed intensively by 
logicians (e.g., Hintikka [1], Lenzen [2]) and computer scientists (see, e.g., 
Halpern [3] and Parikh [4]) with increasing interest in this area. Research on 
knowledge transfer in a distributed environment, where several agents commu- 
nicate, is of topical interest (cf. Halpern and Moses [5], Chandy and Misra [6], 
Orlowska and Sanders [7], Fagin et al. [8]). Various approaches to the 
concepts of joint knowledge and common knowledge of groups or agents have 
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been proposed (Halpern and Moses [5], Mazer [9], Orlowska [10], and many 
others). 
Rasiowa and Marek [11] proposed a new approach to reasoning about 
knowledge of groups of fully communicating intelligent agents. Their approach 
is based on the following assumptions. 
1. An agent's knowledge of reality is only approximate because her infor- 
mation is often incomplete. 
2. An agent's knowledge about a predicate p due to her perception of p, 
that is, her knowledge of characteristic features of p, is acquired by 
collecting information by research and other means. 
3. An agent's knowledge about a predicate p can also be due to her ability 
to draw conclusions and thus to classify objects as instances and non-in- 
stances of p. 
4. The ability to perceive facts or to drawn conclusions can differ among 
agents. 
5. The abilities of agents may be comparable or not comparable in the sense 
that one agent may be more capable in some situations and other agents 
more capable in others. 
With this point of view, Rasiowa and Marek [11] considered two kinds of 
knowledge operators: perception operators and epistemic operators. Perception 
operators correspond to approximation operators in predicate logic for approxi- 
mation reasoning (Rasiowa [12, 13]), whereas epistemic operators correspond 
to those of Orlowska [10] and are inspired by the rough-sets approach of 
Pawlak [14]. In the present paper I consider only perception operators. The 
resulting logic will be called perception logic. 
Perception logic deals with the following situation. A partially ordered set (a 
poset) T = (T, ___) of agents is given. The intended meaning of t <_ w for 
t, w in T is that abilities of agent t are less than or equal to those of agent w. 
A poset T will be called a type of logic. We assume that all agents observe the 
same reality and that each has her own perception of that reality. Condition 
t < w implies that for any predicate p a set implementing the perception of p 
by agent w is contained in the set implementing the perception of p by agent 
t. We assume that each agent is aware of other agents' perceptions and does 
not attempt o modify them. Each agent takes into consideration egative 
perceptions of agents with less or equal abilities. The totality of agents attempt 
to reach consensus, that is, conclusions agreeing with common statements. We 
shall also consider the joint perception of groups of agents; we shall consider 
only the joint perception of T groups--subsets of T such that with any agent t 
they also contain each agent w whose abilities are less than or equal to those of 
t. 
The purpose of this paper is to describe two theorem-proving systems for 
perception logics for all possible posets of agents. The first system is of 
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Gentzen's style. It consists of decomposition schemes for formulas and is 
based on the similar system for classical predicate calculus due to Rasiowa and 
Sikorski [15]. A similar system for m-valued predicate logic is formulated in 
Orlowska [16]. In order to present he second theorem-proving system, which 
is of a resolution style, we consider the Skolem method of eliminating 
quantifiers for perception logics, Herbrand models, and the Herbrand resolu- 
tion-style theorem. The resolution theorem-proving system is based on a 
system for classical predicate logic given by Robinson [17] and is a modifica- 
tion of that of Orlowska [16] for m-valued predicate Post logic. 
The semantics of perception logic of any type T is equivalent to the 
algebraic semantics of approximation logic of the same type (see Rasiowa 
[12]), which is based on plain semi-Post algebras (Cat-Ho and Rasiowa [18]); 
all results in this paper can also be treated as analogous results for approxima- 
tion logics of finite types presented earlier by Rasiowa [12, 13, 19] without 
modal operators and also as results for semi-Post predicate logics of finite 
types. 
2. PERCEPT ION LOGICS 
In this section formalized languages of perception logics and their semantics 
will be described. 
Assume that an arbitrary finite poset T = (T, <)  is given; it will be called a 
type  of perception logic. We shall consider a family L T of all subsets s of T 
satisfying the following condition: if w ~: t and t is in s, then w is also in s. 
T will be interpreted as a set of cooperating agents, w < t as the fact that 
abilities of w are less than or equal to those of t, and sets in L T as T-groups 
of cooperating agents. Clearly the empty set Q) and T belong to L T. 
A language L T of a perception logic of type T is a first-order predicate 
language with propositional connectives of disjunction U, conjunction N,  
implication = , negation ~,  perception connectives d t for t in T, proposi- 
tional constants e s for s in LT ,  and quantifiers v, 3. This language also 
contains a countable set Var of individual variables in L T and functional and 
predicate symbols. By F n for n = 0, 1 . . . . .  we denote the set of all n-ary 
functional symbols; in particular, Fun o is a set of individual constants; by 
Pred n for n = 1,2 . . . .  we denote the set of all n-ary predicates in L r. We 
assume that there is at least one predicate in L T; the set of functional symbols 
can be empty. Terms and formulas are defined in the usual way. 
The set Ter of all terms in L T is the least set containing Var U Fun o and 
such that if f~Fun n, n :g 0, and 01 . . . . .  0 n are in Ter, then f (O  1 . . . . .  0n) is 
in Ter. 
Atomic formulas are propositional constants es for s in L T and expressions 
p(O 1 . . . . .  0n), where p e Pred n and 01 . . . . .  0 n eTer .  Other formulas are 
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built of atomic ones by means of propositional connectives and quantifiers. We 
shall use the following abbreviations: A ¢* B for (A  = B) N (B ~ A), and 
dsA,  where s~LT ,  s ~ Q,  for conjunction of formulas dtA  for all tEs .  
We read es as "true from the viewpoint of T-group s,"  s ~ LT ,  in particular 
e• as "false from the viewpoint of T-group T , "  and e r as "true from the 
viewpoint of T" ;  dtA  as "agent t perceives A , "  where t~ T; and dsA as 
"T-group s jointly perceives A , "  where s~LT ,  s =/: (~. Any formula A 
different from e s, s~LT ,  not having d t in front of it, is read as "there is 
consensus about A . "  
We assume that the reader is familiar with the notions of free and bound 
variables. A formula is said to be open if it does not contain quantifiers and 
closed if it does not contain free variable. 
By a model of language L x in a nonempty set U we shall mean any 
mapping M that assigns to each c ~ Fun o an element c~ in U, to each functor 
f~Fun n, n ~: 0, a function fM:U  n---, U, and to every predicate pePred  n 
and t~ T, an n-ary relation P t~-  Un (which corresponds to dtP, i.e., 
perception by an agent t of the predicate p) in such a way that 
if t < w in T, then PwM ~ PtM (1) 
Thus every model M in U assigns to every predicate p e Pred n a family 
(PtM)t~T of n-ary relations satisfying (1). 
Denote by Val(M) the set of all valuations of individual variables of L T in 
the universe U of model M,  that is, of  all mappings v:Var ~ U. 
Given a model M and a valuation v e Val(M),  we assign to each term 0 an 
element 0Mo in U as follows: x~ = v(x)  for x~Var ,  c~o = c M for each 
ce  Fun o, and f(O l . . . . .  On)~ = fM(OlM . . . . . .  On~o). 
Now we define the satisfiability of any formula A in model M by a 
valuation v, to be written My ~ A ,  starting with formulas that have a 
perception connective dt,  t ~. T, in front, by adopting: 
My ~ die s iff t ~ s, for s ~ L T (2) 
My = dtP(O 1 . . . . .  0n) iff (0,M . . . . . .  0nMo) ePt~,  for p6Pred  n (3) 
My ~ dt( A O B) iff Mv ~ dtA  or My = dtB (4) 
My ~ dt( A O B) iff My = dtA  and My ~ dtB (5) 
My ~ dt (~A)  i f f for  every w _< t it is not true that My ~ dwA,  (6) 
Mo I:: d t (Z  ~ B) iff for every w < t, 
either it is not true that Mv ~ d w A or My ~ dw B (7) 
Mv ~ dtdwA iff Mv ~ dwA (8) 
Mv=d,(Vx)AiffforeveryueU, Mvu=d,A (9) 
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where v, is defined thus: 
v.(x) = u, and v.(y) = v(y) for y q: x, y~Var  
My ~ (3 x) A iff there exists u E U, such that My. = dt A (10) 
For every formula A that has no perception connective dt in front of it, we 
assume that 
My = A i f ffor every tE T, My ~ dtA 11) 
Note that (11) and (8) yield 
For every formula A o fLT :  Mv ~ A iff for every teT ,  My ~ dtA 
(12) 
Next, let us give an interpretation of (2)-(11). According to (2), agent t 
perceives belief of T-group s if she belongs to this T-group. The meaning of 
(3) is that each agent follows her own perception. The interpretation of (4) and 
(5) is obvious. The intuitive meaning of (6) and (7) is that according to our 
intuition each agent is careful with negative statements and takes under 
consideration egative perceptions of all agents who have less or equal 
abilities, that is, who are "less informed." Condition (8) asserts that all the 
perceptions are generally known and that the agents do not attempt to modify 
other agents' opinions. The meaning of (9) and (10) is that each agent 
conceives universal and existential statements in scope of her perception and 
understands general and existential quantifiers as generalized conjunctions and 
disjunctions, respectively. Condition (11) asserts that every formula A that 
does not have a perception connective dt, t ~ T, in front, is satisfied in M by 
valuation if and only if there is consensus about satisfaction of A by v in M 
of all agents in T. 
It is easy to show that 
Mv ~ ~d tA iffnot Mv ~ d tA and Mv ~ d w~d tA i f fMv= -~d tA 
(13) 
My ~ (dtA  = dtB) iffnot My ~ dtA or My ~ dtB (14) 
MyrA o B i f f forevery t6T :  Mv~dtA  i f fMv~dtB  (15) 
Mv~dsAfors~.LT ,  s=gQ, i f fMv~dtAforeveryt~s  (16) 
If w < t, then My ~ dtA  implies My ~ dwA (17) 
If w < t, then not My ~ dtA fq -~dwA (18) 
If t < w, then .My ~ dtA 0 -~dwA (19) 
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It follows from (12) and (17) that 
My ~ A iff for all maximal t in (T, < ), My ~ d, A (20) 
If in the poset (T,  < ) there exists a greatest element V, 
then Mv = A iff My ~ dv A. 
A formula A is said to be valid in a modeIM if MyrA for every 
valuation v G Val(M). A set of formulas is said to be valid in M if every 
formula in this set is valid in M. A formula is said to be a tautology if it is 
valid in every model M. 
A formula A is said to be et-valid, t G T, provided d t A is a tautology. A
formula A is said to be es-valid (sGLT, s ~ (~), if dsA is a tautology, that 
is, if and only if it is et-valid for every t G s. 
THEOREM 2.1 The following conditions are equivalent to each other: 
(i) A formula A is a tautology. 
(ii) A is er-valid, that is, d t A is a tautology for all t G T. 
(iii) A is et-valid for all maximal t in (T, < ); in particular, if there 
exists a greatest element V in (T, <), A is ev-valid, that is, 
dv A is a tautology. 
Applying (2)-(15), one can prove the following theorem. 
THEOREM 2.2 The following formulas are tautologies (Rasiowa [12], 
Rasiowa and Marek [11]): 
(a0) axiom schemes for intuitionistic logic, 
(al) dt(A U B) ¢~ (dtA U dtB ) 
(a2) dt(A N B) o (dtA n dtB ) 
(a3) d t (A=B)¢*  n (dwA =dw B) 
w<_t  
(a4) dt( ~ A) -- n ~ dw A 
w<l  
(a5) dtdwA o dwA 
(a6) dte ~for tEs ,  ~dte s fo r t¢s ,seLT  
(a7) d tAU ~dtA,  t~T 
(a8) A,~ U(dtANet )  
t~T  
These formulas were used as axioms in an axiom system for approximation 
logic without modal operators in Ref. 12 and for perception logic in Ref. l l .  
THEOREM 2.3 For any formulas A, B, Gin L T and t G T, the follow- 
ing formulas are tautologies. 
(A UB)  n Co  (An  C) U (BNC)  
(A nB) u c , ,  (A U C) n (Bu c) 
-~dt (AUB)  o( -~d,  AO=d,B)  =d, (AnB)  o( -~d,  AU=dtB)  
~dt (A~B)  ¢, U(dwAn~dwB)  ~dt~A¢~ UdwA 
w<--t w~t  
~dtA ¢~ dtA 
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3. GENTZEN SYSTEM FOR PERCEPTION LOGIC 
The system to be presented in this section is based on the analogous ystem 
for first-order classical logic given in Rasiowa and Sikorski [15] and is a 
modification of systems in Saloni [20] and Orlowska [161. 
A formula in L T is said to be indecomposable if it has one of the forms 
d t A or ~ d t A,  where A is an atomic formula and t e T. A finite sequence of 
formulas is said to be indecomposable if either it is empty or it consists of 
indecomposable formulas (cf. [15]). A finite sequence of formulas is said to be 
fundamenta l  if it contains either a pair of formulas d t A ,  ~ d w A for some 
t < w and atomic A or one of the formulas d t e s for t ~ s, ~ d t es for t ~ s. It 
follows from (19) and (a6) that a disjunction of all formulas in a fundamental 
sequence is a tautology. 
Given an arbitrary te  T, we shall denote by wl(t) . . . . .  wk(t) a subse- 
quence ( t  I . . . . .  t m) consisting of all w _< t in (T,  _<). 
In the following, S' will denote any finite indecomposable sequence of 
formulas in L x, and S" any finite sequence of formulas in L x. 
We consider the following decomposition schemes [in which a semicolon (;) 
will be used to separate sequences of formulas[. 
S',d,(A U B),S" (u) 
S', d tA ,  d tB ,  S" 
S',=dt(A U B),S" 
S', -~ dtA ,  S"; S', ~ dtB ,  S" 
(n) 
S',d,(AnB),S" 
S', d tA ,  S"; S', d tB ,  S" 
(~n) S', ~dt (A  N B) ,  S" 
S', ~ dtA ,  ~ dtB ,  S" 
(=) S', at( A = B) ,  S" 
S ' ,  ~ dw~(t ) A,  dw,~)B, S", . . . .  S', ~ dwelt )A ,  dwk~t)B, S" 
S', ~ dt (A  = B) ,  S" 
S', dw,(t)A . . . . .  dwk t(t)A, dwk~t)A, S"; 
S', dw,(t)A . . . . .  dwk ,~t) A ,  ~ dwk~t)B, S"; "'" 
S', -~ dw,tt)B, dw2~t)A . . . . .  dw, ~t)A,  dwk~t)A, S"; " "  
S', ~ dw,tt)B . . . . .  ~ dwk(t)B, S" 
S', d t (~A) ,  S" 
S', ~ d~,(t) A , S" ; . . . ;S' ,  ~ dwk(t) A , S" 
S ' ,~dt (~A) ,S  " 
(~ ~ ) 
S', dw,~t)A . . . . .  dwelt)A, S" 
422 Helena Rasiowa 
(v) 
S', dtdwA, S" 
(at) S', d w A,  S" 
S', dt(Vx) A (x ) ,  S" 
S ' ,d tA(z ) ,S"  
S', ~ dtdwA,  S" 
(-~dt) 
S ' ,~dwA,S"  
where z E Var and does not occur in 
any formula above the line 
where 0 is any term in Ter 
S" 
S', -~ d,A(O), S", -~ dt(vx ) A( x) 
S', dt(3x) A (x ) ,  S" 
(3) where 0 is any term in Ter 
S', dtA(O), S", dt(3x) A( x) 
S ' , -~dt(3x)A(x  ) , S" 
(7 3) where z ~ Var and does not occur in 
S ' ,~dtA(z ) ,S  " 
any formula above the line 
Every scheme given above has the form S/(S I . . . . .  Sk), where k _ 1. By 
dis S for every sequence S we denote the disjunction of all formulas in S. A 
sequence S above the line is called a conclusion, and sequences Sl . . . . .  S k 
below the line are called the premises of a scheme. The greatest number of 
premises appear in (7 =) ,  where there are 2 k(t), where k(t) is the number of 
all w_< t in (T ,  _<). 
Let us note that decomposition schemes have the following properties. 
THEOREM 3.1 For each decomposition scheme listed above of a form 
S 
$1 ; . . .  ; Sk 
and for every t ~ T, dis S is et-valid if and only if dis S~ f) • • • f) dis S~ 
is e t- vafid. 
An easy proof by verification is based on (4)-(14) in Section 2. 
With every formula of a form d t A,  t e T, we can associate a decomposi- 
tion tree formed by the following successive applications of decomposition 
schemes. Since S' in every decomposition scheme is an indecomposable 
sequence, exactly one decomposition scheme can be applied to the first of those 
formulas in this sequence that are not indecomposable. The highest order of 
branching is found in the case of (-~ = ). To every node of the tree we assign a 
finite sequence of formulas, namely its premise in a decomposition scheme. If 
an indecomposable s quence or a fundamental sequence is assigned to a node, 
then we will not continue the process of decomposition i this node, and the 
sequence is said to be an end sequence. It follows from (a6) and (a7) and the 
definition of a tautology that for any end sequence S, dis S is a tautology if and 
only if S is fundamental. Hence, by Theorem 3.1, we obtain the following 
theorems. 
Mechanical Proof Systems for Logic 423 
THEOREM 3.2 I f  a decomposit ion tree o f  a fo rmula  d lA  is finite, then 
the fo l lowing conditions are equivalent: 
(i) A is el-valid. 
(ii) d t A is a tautology. 
(iii) Al l  the end sequences in the decomposit ion tree o f  d t A are 
fundamental .  
THEOREM 3.3 l f  a decomposit ion tree o f  a fo rmula  d tA ,  where te  T, 
is infinite, then d t A is not a tautology; that is, A is not el-valid. 
Proof Assume that the decomposition tree of a formula d t A is infinite. 
Then there exists an infinite branch BR. Let F be the set of all indecomposable 
formulas appearing in at least one sequence assigned to a node in BR. Note that 
if an indecomposable formula appears in a sequence assigned to a node, then it 
also appears in all sequences assigned to successive nodes of this branch. Since 
the branch BR is infinite, none of these sequences i fundamental. This implies 
that for every atomic formula C at most one of the formulas d t, C and ~ dwC 
for t '  _< w occurs in F and neither d t, e s for t '  e s nor ~ d t, e s for t '  ¢ s, 
s ~ L T, occurs in F. Let M be a model of L x in the set Ter of all terms, 
defined as follows: 
C M = C for each c E Fun o 
fM(O~ . . . . .  On) = f (O I . . . . .  0n) for each fe  Fun~ and 01 . . . . .  0 n ~ Ter 
PwM ~ Tern for every p e Pred~ 
where 
(0, . . . . .  On) ePwMi f f  dt. P(O, . . . . .  On)¢F forevery  t' <_ w 
It is easy to show that t '  _< w implies that PwM c Pt 'M,  that is, that this 
definition is correct. 
Let i be the identity valuation in Var; that is, i (x )  = x for every x E Var. 
We shall show that M i  ~ d I A .  For that purpose let us assume the following 
inductive definition of order of a formula. If B is an atomic formula, then 
ordB = 1; ord(Bl* B2) = max(ord Bl ,Ord B2) + 1, where * e{U,  f3 , =};  
ord( ° B) = ord B + 1, where 
°e{~} U {(vx) :  xeVar}  U {(3x) :  xeVar}  U {dl}t~ r. 
Let F '  be the set of all formulas in F that are satisfied by valuation i in M;  
that is, B e F '  if and only if B ~ F and Mi  ~ B. Assume that M i  ~ d t Z.  
Thus F '  is not empty. Let B 0 be a formula in F '  such that ord B 0 _< ord B for 
each B in F ' .  We easily prove, taking under consideration all decomposition 
schemes, that B o is an indecomposable formula. 
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Since d r e s ~ F for t' ~ s and ~ d t, e s ~ F for t '  ¢ s, thus B o can be of one 
of the following forms: dce  s for t' ¢s;  -~dce s for t' ~s, dwp(O ~ . . . . .  0n); 
or ~ dwp(O l . . . . .  0n) for some p E Pred n, 0j . . . . .  0 n e Ter, w e T. By (2) 
and (13), M i  ~ dce  ~ for t '  ¢~s and Mi  q~ ~ dce  s for t '  ~s. If B o is 
dwP(O l . . . . .  0n) and Mi  ~ dwP(O ~ . . . . .  0n), then by (3) and the definition 
of M,  d t,p(O! . . . . .  On) ¢F  for every t '  _< w. This contradicts the assump- 
tion that B oeF '  c F. If B 0 is ~dwp(O ~ . . . . .  0n) and Mi  ~ 
dwp(O l . . . . .  0n), then by (3) and (13), M i  q~ dwp(O I . . . . .  0n). Thus there 
exists t '  < w such that d t, p(O i . . . . .  On) ~ F. This is in contradiction with the 
assumption that ~ d~p(O 1 . . . . .  On) e F" c F, and both dc P(O l . . . . .  On) and 
~ dwP(O 1 . . . . .  0n) cannot occur in F for t' < w. Thus M i  q~ dtA ,  which 
completes the proof of Theorem 3.3. • 
As a corollary to Theorems 3.2 and 3.3, we obtain the following theorem 
characterizing et-valid formulas for t e T. 
THEOREM 3.4 For every formula  A in L T and every t ~ T, the fol low- 
ing conditions are equivalent: 
(i) Formula A is et-valid. 
(ii) d t A is a tautology. 
(iii) The decomposit ion tree fo r  d t A is .finite, and all end sequences 
are fundamental .  
The following theorem, being a corollary to Theorem 3.4 and (20), plays the 
role of completeness theorem for the given proof system. 
THEOREM 3.5 A formula  A in L T is a tautology o f  perception logic o f  
type T = (T,  <_ ) i f  and only i f  fo r  every maximal  t ~ T, the decomposi- 
tion tree fo r  d t A is f inite and all the end sequences are fundamental .  In 
particular, i f  there exists in T a greatest element V, then A is a 
tautology i f  and only i f  the decomposit ion tree o f  dvA  is f inite and all 
its end sequences are fundamental .  
4. ELIMINATION OF QUANTIFIERS AND A RESOLUTION STYLE 
HERBRAND THEOREM 
A formula A is said to be in a prenex form if all quantifiers occurring in 
A are collected at the beginning of A (so that they precede an open formula, 
that is, a formula without quantifiers). 
THEOREM 4.1 For any formula  d t A ,  where t e T, there is a formula  B 
in a prenex fo rm such that d t A ¢, B is a tautology, and B ~ d w B is a 
tautology fo r  every w ~ T. 
The proof of the first part is based on the following tautologies: 
1. d t (Vx)A(x  ) ¢~ (Vx)dtA(x )  
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2. d tOx)A(x )  o Ox)dtA(x  ) 
3. dt ~ (Vx)A(x )  ** (3x l )  " "  (3x~) TM dwt(t) A (x j )  0 " '"  CI 
dwk(t ) A(Xk) 
4. d t~(3x)A(x )  ¢0 (Vx) ['7 ~dwA(X)  
w<l  
5. dt(B f7 (Vx)A(x ) )  ¢* (Vx)dt (B  f7 A(x) )  
6. dt(B 0 ( ]x )A(x ) )  ¢~ ( ]x )dt (B  [7 A(x) )  
7. dt(B U (Vx)A(x ) )  ¢, (Vx)dt(B O A(x) )  
8. dt(B tO ( ]x ) (A(x ) )  ¢, ( ]x )d t (B  tA A(x) )  
9. d t ( (Vx)A(x  ) = B) ¢~ (3Xl) " '"  (3xk)(dw,<t)A(xt)) = dw,<t)B) 
N ' ' '  (7 (dwk(t)A(xk)) = dwk(t)B ) 
10. d, ( (3x)A(x )  = B) ¢, (Vx) N (dwA(X)  = dwB) 
w<_t 
11. d,(B = (Vx)A(x ) )  ¢~ (Vx) ['7 (dwB = dwA(X))  
w<_t 
12. dt(B = (3x)A(x ) )  ¢~ (3xl) " "  (3xk)(dw~(t)B = dw,(,)A(xl)) 
A ' ' '  0 (dw~t)B = dwk(t)A(x~) ) 
where wj(t) . . . . .  wk(t) in (3), (9), and (12) are all w from T that satisfy 
w < t, and formula B in (5)-(12) does not contain free variables x I . . . . .  xk. 
The second part of Theorem 4.1 follows from the first by (12), (a2), and 
(a3). In fact, if dtA  ¢, B is a tautology, then dw(dtA ¢, B) is a tautology for 
each we T. Hence, d,A  ¢* dwB is a tautology for we  T. Thus B ¢* dwB is 
a tautology. • 
Given any formula A in L x, we can by application of Theorem 4.1 
associate with every formula d t A for t e T a formula B t in prenex form such 
that B t ¢~ dtA  is a tautology and dwB t ¢~ B t is a tautology for every we T. 
Applying to each of these formulas B t the Skolem method of elimination of 
quantifiers (cf. [15], p. 334) by adjoining new functional symbols, we obtain a 
set Sk(A) = {Ot}t~ T of open formulas 0 t such that the following theorem 
holds: 
THEOREM 4.2 I f  a formula A is valid in a model M in U ~ 0 ,  then 
every formula f rom Sk(A)  is valid in some model M '  in U that is an 
extension o f  M such that M '  and M coincide on functional symbols 
(including individual constants) and predicates occurring in A. Con- 
versely, i f  every formula f rom Sk(A) is valid in a model M,  then the 
formula A is also valid in M. 
Due to Theorem 2.3 we have the following statement about the normal form 
of formulas d t A without quantifiers, t e T. 
THEOREM 4.3 For every open formula dt A ,  t e T, there exists a for- 
mula B that is a conjunction o f  disjunctions o f  indecomposable formu- 
las, such that d t A ¢~ B is a tautology. 
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Theorems 4 .1-4 .3  enable us to reduce the satisfiability problem for arbitrary 
formulas to the satisfiability problem for open formulas in the normal form. 
An open formula is said to be a D-clause if it is a disjunction of 
indecomposable formulas and at least one of them is a predicate formula. Let 
C be a set of D-clauses. By the Herbrand universe o f  C we shall mean the 
set HU(C)  of all terms in Ter that are constructed from the functional symbols 
occurring in D-clauses in C, and including an additional constant symbol if no 
individual constant appears in these D-clauses. By the Herbrand base of C 
we understand the set HB(C) consisting of all the substitution instances [over 
HU(C)] of all indecomposable formulas that are subformulas of D-clauses in 
C. Let HB- (C)  be the set of all formulas -~A, such that A 6HB(C)  or -~ 
A e HB(C) (we identify -~ -~ A and A;  this is correct because indecomposable 
formulas are of forms dtB  , ~ dtB  , and by Theorem 2.3, -~ -~ dtB  ¢~ dtB  is a 
tautology). 
Let H(C)  = HB(C) U HB- (C) .  Note that no individual variables occur in 
formulas in H(C) ,  and so the satisfiability of these formulas in any model does 
not depend of valuations. A subset X c H(C)  is said to be C-consistent if 
neither die  s for t~s  nor -~ dwe ~ for w~s is in X and it is impossible that -~ 
d t A and d w A ,  where t < w, both belong to X.  All other subsets are said to 
be C-inconsistent. A C-consistent set X c H(C)  is said to be C-complete if 
for every A eH(C)  the condition A CX implies that X 12 { A} is C-incon- 
sistent. The following theorem follows from this definition. 
THEOREM 4.4 For every C-complete set X ~ H(C)  and every d t A 
H(C) ,  exactly one o f  fo rmulas  d t A ,  ~ d t A is in X .  
Proof First we prove that if dte  s EH(C)  and dte ~ ¢X,  then t Cs. In fact, 
since X 12 {drew} is C-inconsistent, either t¢s  or there is w < t such that -~ 
d w e s ~ X .  Hence, if t e s, then w e s and -~ d w e s ~ X .  This is in contradiction 
with C-consistency of X.  Thus t ¢ s. Similarly, we prove that if dte  ~ ~ H(C)  
and ~ d t e s ~ X ,  then t e s. Thus exactly one of the formulas d t e s, ~ d t e~ is in 
X.  If for any atomic predicate formula A,  d t A ~ X and ~ d t A ~ X ,  then 
X U { d t A } and X 12 { ~ d t A } are C-inconsistent. Hence there are w __. t _.< 
w' such that ~ d w A e X and d w, A ~ X ,  which is in contradiction with the 
assumption of C-consistency of X.  • 
Every C-complete set X c H(C)  determines a model for the language L T 
restricted to all functional symbols and predicates that occur in at least one 
D-clause in C. This model is defined over HU(C) ,  that is, the Herbrand 
universe for C. It will be denoted by Mc(X)  [if C is fixed simply by M(X) ]  
and called the Herbrand model  for C. So we come to the following 
definition. 
(ml)  CM(x) = c for every individual constant c e Fun o (7 HU(C).  
(m2) fM~x)(01 . . . . .  On) = f (O 1 . . . . .  0,1) for f~  Fun n, where 
f(O~ . . . . .  On) ~ HU(C).  
Mechanical Proof Systems for Logic 427 
(m3) Ptm(x) c_ HU(C) n for p ~ Pred n, and 
i) If dtP(O i . . . . .  On) ~ H(C) ,  then 
(0! . . . . .  On) EPtM(X) 
(0, . . . . .  0.) CP,~x~ 
if dtp(O 1 . . . . .  On) eX  
if -~ dtp(O I . . . . .  On) ~ X 
(ii) If dtP(O l . . . . .  On) 6H(C) ,  then 
(0 1 . . . . .  On) EPtM(X) iffthere is t' ~ T, t _< t' 
such that dcp(O I . . . . .  On) eX  
Let us show that this definition is correct, that is, that it really defines a 
model. We shall show that t _< w implies Pwm(x) c_ Ptm(x). Assume that 
(0~ . . . . .  On) ~Pwm(x)" We shall consider four possible cases. 
1. If dwP(O I . . . . .  On) e H(C)  and dtp(O ~ . . . . .  On) e l l (C ) ,  then 
dwP(O ~ . . . . .  On) eX .  This implies that dtp(O ~ . . . . .  On)eX.  Other- 
wise -~dtp(O I . . . . .  On) eX ,  which is in contradiction with C-con- 
sistency of X. Hence (01 . . . . .  0n) ePtm(x) .  
2. If dwp(O j . . . . .  On) e H(C)  and dtP(O 1 . . . . .  On) C H(C) ,  then 
dwP(O i . . . . .  On) ~ X and t -< w; thus (01 . . . . .  On) ~ PtM(X)" 
3. If dwp(O I . . . . .  On) 6H(C)  and dtP(O 1 . . . . .  On) eH(C) ,  then the con- 
dition (0~ . . . . .  On) ~Pwm(x) implies that there is w', w <_ w', such that 
dw, P(O I . . . . .  On) eX .  Thus, t _< w _< w'. Claim dtp(O 1 . . . . .  On)~X.  
Otherwise ~ dtP(O 1 . . . . .  On) ~X,  which is in contradiction with the 
C-consistency of X. 
4. If dwp(O I . . . . .  On) ¢ H(C)  and d,p(Oj . . . . .  On) ¢ H(C) ,  then 
(01 . . . . .  On)~p~m(x) implies that there is a w', w <_ w' such that 
d~, p(O ~ . . . . .  On) ~ X .  Since t <_ w <_ w', it follows that (01 . . . . .  On) 
PtM(X)" This completes the proof that the definition of Herbrand model 
M(X)  is correct. • 
By the definition of Herbrand models, Theorem 4.4, and (13), the following 
theorem holds. 
TrtEOREM 4.5 A formula  A f rom H(C)  is valid in a Herbrand model  
M(X) ,  determined by a C-complete subset X o f  H(C)  i f  and only i f  
A~X.  
Using a method of semantic trees similar to the one used for classical 
predicate logic, we can prove the following theorem. 
THEOREM 4.6 I f  a set C o f  D-clauses is valid in a certain model  M,  
then there exists a C-complete set X c_ H(C)  such that C is valid in the 
Herbrand model  Me(X) ,  determined by X .  
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Proof By a semantic tree we mean a binary tree in which the empty set of 
formulas is assigned to the root and formulas from the set H(C) are assigned 
to other nodes in the following manner. Given a node n, we assign to the 
immediate successors of n formulas d t h and -~ d t A if the set of all formulas 
assigned to all the predecessors of n and to n remains C-consistent by 
ad jo in ing  d t A and remains C-consistent by adjoining ~ d t A. This procedure 
is continued for all formulas from the Herbrand base HB(C). It follows that 
the set of formulas assigned to each branch is C-consistent and C-complete. 
Moreover, the sets of formulas assigned to all particular branches give all 
C-complete subsets X of H(C), that is, represent all Herbrand models for set 
C of D-clauses. • 
For any set C of D-clauses, let [C] denote the set of all formulas obtained 
by substitution of terms from the Herbrand universe HU(C) for free individual 
variables in formulas from C. 
Given a semantic tree of a set C of D-clauses, by a failure point of a 
branch of this tree we mean the earliest node n of this branch such that the set 
X of all formulas assigned to all the predecessors of n satisfies the following 
condition: There exists a formula A ~ [C] such that A is not valid in the 
Hebrand model Mc( X ). 
Theorem 4.6 and the next one will be applied in the proof of the Herbrand 
theorem. 
THEOREM 4.7 Let C be a set of D-clauses in a language L T. I f  C is not 
valid in any model M of  L x, then every branch in any semantic tree of 
C has a failure point. 
Proof Consider a Herbrand model M(X)  determined by a set X of 
formulas assigned to the nodes of a branch of a semantic tree for C. Since by 
the assumption the set C is not valid in any model M, it is not valid in 
M(X) .  Thus there exists a D-clause A in C and a valuation v: Var -* HU(C) 
such that M(X)v  q~ A. Let vA be the formula obtained from A by perform- 
ing substitution determined by the valuation v. Clearly, vA ~ [C] and is a 
disjunction of indecomposable formulas. Thus the branch under consideration 
has an earliest node n such that the finite set X '  of all formulas assigned to the 
predecessors of n is { vA}-complete and vA is not valid in M(X') .  Clearly, n 
is the failure point of this branch. • 
THEOREM 4.8 (Herbrand theorem for perception logic of type T) The 
following conditions are equivalent: 
(i) A set C of D-clauses is not valid in any model. 
(ii) There exists a finite subset C' of [C] such that C' is not valid in any 
model. 
Proof (i) = (ii). Let C be a set of D-clauses that is not valid in any model. 
Consider a semantic tree for C. By Theorem 4.7, every branch of this tree has 
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a failure point. The tree obtained from the tree under consideration by rejecting 
all nodes that are successors of failure points is finite by the K6nig lemma. 
With every branch BR of this tree, let us associate a D-clause A(BR) in C, 
which is not valid in the Herbrand model M(XBR), where XBR is the set of 
formulas assigned to the branch BR. Let VBR be a substitution of terms from 
HU(C) for free individual variables in the formula A(BR), such that 
M(XBR)VBR ~ A(BR). Let C' be the set of D-clauses VBRA(BR) obtained 
from all the formulas A(BR) by performing substitutions VBR. Thus C' c [C], 
C' is finite, and for every branch BR the set C' is not valid in M(XBR). 
Hence, by Theorem 4.6, C' is not valid in any model. This completes the proof 
of Theorem 4.8. • 
5. RESOLUTION SYSTEM FOR PERCEPTION LOGIC OF TYPE T 
The resolution theorem-proving system for perception logic of type T is 
similar to that due to Orlowska [16] for m-valued predicate Post logics. 
The resolution system consists of two inference rules: resolution rule (res) 
and factoring rule (fac). 
The resolution rule has the following form: 
A' U dtB', A" U -~ dwB" 
(res) u( A'  U pr(A"))  for w _< t in T 
where A' and A" are D-clauses, B' and B" are atomic formulas, u is a least 
(with respect to composition of functions) substitution that unifies B" and 
pr(B"), that is, makes them equal, and pr is a permutation of individual 
variables such that A'  U dtB' and pr(A" U dwB") have no common vari- 
ables. 
This rule permits elimination of a pair of indecomposable formulas from a 
pair of D-clauses. 
The factoring rule has the form 
A U B' U B" 
(fac) u(A U pr(B"))  
where A is a D-clause, B' and B" are indecomposable formulas, u is a least 
substitution unifying B'  and pr(B"), and pr is a permutation of individual 
variables uch that B'  and pr(B") have no common variables. 
This rule permits elimination of redundant disjuncts from a D-clause. 
Let [] denote the empty clause, that is, a clause that does not include any 
disjunct. We assume that for every model M and every valuation o in 
Val(M), Mv ~ []. 
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For a given set C of D-clauses, let us denote by Res(C) the least set of 
D-clauses that contains C and is closed under the rules (res) and (fac). Let us 
note the following statement. 
THEOREM 5.1 For any D-clauses A ,  B that have no common variables, 
[Res({A,  B})] = Res( [A]  O [B] )  
The following theorem is a resolution-style theorem on the existence 
o f  models. The proo f  is analogous to that o f  Ortowska [16] fo r  
m-valued predicate Post logics. 
THEOREM 5.2 I f  C is a nonempty set o f  D-clauses uch that [] ~ C and 
Res(C) c C, then there exists a model M such that C is valid in M.  
Proof Assume that for any model M the set C is not valid in M. Hence 
either [] ~ C, which contradicts the hypothesis, or (according to Theorem 4.7) 
every branch of every semantic tree has a failure point. We shall prove that the 
tree obtained from a semantic tree of C by deleting all nodes that are 
successors of the failure points has exactly one node, that is, a root. Indeed, 
otherwise it would be a branch BR with n >_ 2 nodes. The (n - 1)th node 
would have two immediate successors with some formulas d t A and ~ d t A 
assigned to them that are failure points. Let XBR be the set of all formulas 
assigned to the first n - 1 nodes of branch BR, and let us set X t = XBR t.J { 
d t A }, X 2 = XBR U { d t Z} .  It follows from the definition of failure point 
that there exist D-clauses A~ and A 2 in [C] that are not valid in M(X 0 and 
M(X2) ,  respectively. Hence dtA  and -~dtA appear as disjuncts in A I and 
A 2 , respectively. Let u(A'~ LI pr(A~)) be the formula obtained from the pair 
of formulas A I = A '  I t.J dtA ,  A 2 = A' 2 0 -~ dtA  by the application of rule 
(res). By Theorem 5.1, this formula belongs to [C] and is not valid in 
M(XBR), that is, the (n - 1)th node is a failure point, which is in contradic- 
tion with the assumption. Thus the semantic tree under consideration has only 
one node, that is, a root. Since the only clause that is not valid in the Herbrand 
model determined by the empty set of D-clauses is the empty clause, it follows 
that [] e C, which contradicts our assumption that [] ~ C. • 
The next theorem proves the completeness of the resolution rules for 
perception logic of type T. 
THEOREM 5.3 The following conditions are equivalent fo r  any set C o f  
D-clauses: 
(i) For any model M of L T the set C is not valid. 
(ii) There is a derivation of the empty clause [] from set C. 
Proof (i) = (ii). By Theorem 5.2, condition (i) implies that either [] ~ C 
or Res(C) ~ C. The first case yields (ii). Assume that Res(C) ~ C. Let us set 
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C O = C, C l = Res(Co) U C o, and consider for every n _> 1, such that C n is 
defined, the condition 
(*n) either [ ]¢Cn_  land[ ]~C n ,orCn_  1 = C~. 
If (*n) is satisfied, then Cn+ l is not defined, and for every k > 1, C,+ k is 
not defined. 
If (*n) is not satisfied, then we set Cn+ ~ = Res(C~)U Cn. Clearly, for 
every n _ 0, if Cn and Cn+ 1 are  defined, then C~ c C,+1. Let N be the set 
of nonnegative integers. If for every n ~N,  C, is defined, then Res(U~eNC,) 
c_ U,~NC~ and [] ¢ U~eNC,. Hence, by Theorem 5.2 there is a model M 
such that Un~NCn is valid in M, and hence C O = C is valid in M, which is in 
contradiction with (i). This implies that there is n _ 1, such that C~ is defined 
and Cn +l is not defined. In this case condition (*n) is satisfied. If [] ~ C,_ t 
and C~_ l = C~ = Res(C~_ 1) U C~_ I, then Res(C~_ l) _c C~_l, and by The- 
orem 5.2 there is a model M such that C,_ 1 is valid in M. Hence C = C O is 
valid in M, which contradicts (i). Consider the case when [] ¢ C,,_ l but 
[] ~ Cn = Res(C,_ l) U C~_ 1.Thus [] ~ Res(C,_ 1), and (ii) is satisfied. This 
completes the proof that (i) implies (ii). Clearly (ii) implies (i), which 
completes the proof of Theorem 5.3. • 
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